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111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Mar. 30, 2010).  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
PETER KINDER, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 1:10 CV 101 RWS
)
TIMOTHY GEITHNER, )
SECRETARY OF TREASURY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This litigation is one of many cases filed throughout the United States that raise
constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the PPACA” or
“the Act”).   1
This matter is before me on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint [#30].  Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Defendants argue this matter should be
dismissed because I lack subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims and the Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Because I find that I do not
have subject matter jurisdiction, I must dismiss this case. 
I. Introduction
 This challenge to the PPACA was filed by seven Missouri citizens in their individual
capacities.  Plaintiff Peter Kinder has health insurance through the health-care plan provided to
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Missouri’s elected state officials.  Plaintiffs Dale Morris, Robert Osborn and Geraldine Osborn
are eligible to receive health insurance benefits under Medicare and to purchase supplemental
Medicare coverage called “Part C” or “Medicare Advantage.”  Plaintiff Samantha Hill is 21 years
old and does not currently have health insurance.  Plaintiff Julie Keathley is the mother of
Plaintiff M.K. who is eight years old and suffers from autism.  Defendants are Timothy Geithner,
Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury, Hilda Solis, Secretary of the United
States Department of Labor, Eric Holder, United States Attorney General, and Kathleen Sebelius,
Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services.  Each Defendant is
sued in their official capacity.
Plaintiffs advance nine causes of action in their Amended Complaint challenging several
provisions of the Act.  Plaintiffs ask me to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the challenged
provisions and declare those provisions unconstitutional.  Defendants argue this case must be
dismissed because I lack subject matter jurisdiction over this case.  
II. Legal Standard
The purpose of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion is to allow the court to
address the threshold question of jurisdiction, as “judicial economy demands that the issue be
decided at the outset rather than deferring it until trial.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724,
729 (8th Cir. 1990).  The first step for a court determining a 12(b)(1) motion is to “distinguish
between a ‘facial attack’ and a ‘factual attack.’” Id. at 729 n. 6.  “[A] crucial distinction, often
overlooked, [exists] between 12(b)(1) motions that attack the complaint on its face and 12(b)(1)
motions that attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any
pleadings.” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  In the
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opposition to dismissal.  Plaintiffs incorrectly assert in their Response that their affidavits convert
the current motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.  Even if Defendants had
asserted a factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), my review of documents outside the pleadings
would not convert the current motion into a motion for summary judgment.  Osborn, 918 F.2d at
729. 
Complaint, Docket No. 1 at 2.3
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current motion, Defendants make a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction.  Accordingly, I
must restrict myself “to the face of the pleadings, and the non-moving party receives the same
protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Osborn, 918
F.2d at 729 n. 6.2
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), I must accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.  Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).  An action fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
III. Discussion
Plaintiff Kinder currently serves as the elected Lieutenant Governor of the State of
Missouri.  His term expires in 2013.  In the original Complaint Kinder alleged that he brought
this case both in his individual capacity and “in his statutory capacity as Lieutenant Governor
charged with being the advocate for Missouri’s elderly.”   Missouri Attorney General Chris3
Koster filed a motion to intervene in this case on behalf of the State of Missouri in July 2010
because he claimed that only the Missouri Attorney General has statutory authority to bring a suit
on behalf of Missouri.  On August 18, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint which
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specifically indicated that Kinder “is bringing this case in his individual capacity and as an
advocate for the elderly” and that he “is not bringing this case on behalf of the State of Missouri
as a state.”   After the Amended Complaint was filed, Missouri Attorney General Koster was4
permitted to withdraw from the case.  Because Kinder is only pursuing claims on his own behalf
and not on behalf of the State of Missouri, I will strike the reference to Kinder as the Missouri
Lieutenant Governor from the case caption.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1).  Kinder also purports to
bring his claims in his capacity as “an advocate for the elderly.”  None of the claims in the
Amended Complaint appear to rely on Kinder being an advocate for the elderly to establish
standing.  As a result, I do not reach the issue of whether Kinder would have standing as an
advocate of the elderly. 
Defendants have filed a Motion For Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss [#35].  In this motion, Defendants seek to advise me that subsequent to
briefing, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services made determinations that provide an
additional basis for me to find that Count VII is not justiciable at this time.  Memoranda in
addition to a motion to dismiss, response and reply brief “may be filed by either party only with
leave of Court.”  E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(C).  Because the determination by the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services squarely impacts whether I have subject matter jurisdiction over Count VII,
I will grant Defendants’ motion.
Finally, subsequent to briefing, Plaintiffs filed two Notices of Supplemental Authority
[#34 and #36].  To the extent the cases identified in Plaintiffs’ Notices are applicable to the
resolution of the current motion, they will be considered.
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A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As always I must address jurisdictional issues before I assess the merits of Plaintiffs’
claims.  Federal jurisdiction is limited to the power authorized by Article III of the Constitution
and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.  Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 593
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). 
“Article III of the Constitution limits the ‘judicial power’ of the United States to the resolution of
‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, (1982).  The doctrines of standing, ripeness, and
mootness must be employed to determine if a case if justiciable.  Zanders, 573 F.3d at 593
(quoting Schanou v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist. No. 160, 62 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
If a plaintiff does not have standing, if a claim is not ripe, or a claim has been rendered moot, I do
not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.  That a case may present issues that are
particularly “important” or controversial does not cure a complaint’s failure to present an actual
case and controversy. 
1. Standing
There are three elements a plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish standing.  
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.  Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be fairly ... traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not ... the result of the independent action
of some third party not before the court.  Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations and alterations
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omitted). “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter in which the
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive states of litigation.”  Id. at 561.  “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of
injury, resulting from the Defendants conduct may suffice.”  Id.  In other words, allegations of
injury are liberally construed and assumed to be true at this stage of the proceedings.  However, 
“[i]t is a long-settled principle that standing cannot be inferred
argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must
affirmatively appear in the record.  And it is the burden of the party
who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor clearly to allege
facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial
resolution of the dispute.  Thus [Plaintiffs] in this case must allege
facts essential to show jurisdiction.  If they fail to make the necessary
allegations, they have no standing.”
  FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (internal citations and punctuation omitted).  
(a.) Count I
In Count I Plaintiffs allege the PPACA is unconstitutional because it “commandeers
Missouri’s duly elected state officials and compels them to enforce a federal regulatory health-
care scheme.”  More specifically, Plaintiffs allege Section 1314 requires states “to implement and
maintain ‘reinsurance’ programs for the individual and small group market private insurance
plans that experience a higher level of claims.”  Plaintiffs further allege Section 1513 “requires
[Missouri] to provide...a ‘qualified health benefit plan’ or face a substantial financial penalty.” 
Plaintiffs allege the PPACA violates the Tenth Amendment and Kinder argues, for the first time
in his Response, that he is specifically injured because the PPACA places a burden on the
performance of his duties as an elected official of Missouri.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim that Missouri is being
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commandeered into enforcing federal law in violation of the Tenth Amendment.  Defendants also
argue that dismissal is appropriate because the Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual
allegations as to what actions Kinder is being forced to take or any other factual allegation from
which I could conclude that Kinder, or any of the other Plaintiffs, is injured as alleged in Count I. 
To whatever extent Plaintiffs allege an injury to the sovereign interests of the State of
Missouri, they do not have standing to bring these claims because Plaintiffs, including Kinder,
bring this case as individuals.  As the Supreme Court has observed, a plaintiff “generally must
assert his own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.”  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474.  “[A] private party does not have
standing to assert that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of
the Tenth Amendment absent the involvement of a state or its instrumentalities.”  United States
v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2009).  While the State of Missouri may have standing to
assert the claim in Count I, it is not a party to this action and Plaintiff Kinder and the other
Plaintiffs do not and cannot bring this action on behalf of Missouri.  As a result, Plaintiffs do not
have standing to assert a violation of the Tenth Amendment in Count I.  
Kinder argues he has suffered an injury by the PPACA’s “interfer[ing] with, and [placing
a] burden on, his performance of his duties as an officer of the State.”   However, this argument5
fails because Kinder pursues his claims in this case only as an individual and not as the
Lieutenant Governor of Missouri.
Because Plaintiffs attempt to pursue claims that uniquely belong to the State of Missouri
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where the employer is a state government, any plan “established or maintained for its
employees...by the government of any State” qualifies as minimum essential coverage, and as a
result, Missouri is free to choose the coverage it offers it employees.  Because I find Plaintiffs
lack standing I do not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim.  
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and have failed to establish a violation of their individual rights, they do not have standing to
pursue a claim that the PPACA violates the Tenth Amendment.  I will therefore dismiss Count I. 
(b.) Count II 
In Count II Plaintiffs allege Section 1513 of the Act is unconstitutional because it
interferes with the right of Missouri citizens and voters to determine the compensation Missouri
provides its state officials and state employees.   Missouri provides constitutional officers and6
state employees with health care pursuant to the Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan. 
Plaintiffs argue that because Section 1513 requires Missouri, as an employer, to provide a
qualified health benefit plan or pay a penalty, it mandates part of the compensation package for
elected state officials.  Plaintiffs argue the PPACA may “impose administrative and regulatory
burdens on the Office of the Lieutenant Governor” which will in turn “increase the cost to
taxpayers and limit the choices of benefit recipients.”  Kinder argues that Section 1513 will limit
the healthcare choices available to him.  In his affidavit, Kinder asserts a new claim, not found in
the Amended Complaint, that he is injured because he has the duty to recruit and hire employees
to staff the Office of the Lieutenant Governor and the nature and cost of insurance affects his
ability to perform this duty.  
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert such a claim.   Kinder does7
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not have standing because he has not alleged that he is injured by the challenged provision.  The
PPACA does not go into effect until January 1, 2014 and Kinder’s term as Lieutenant Governor
ends in January 2013.  As a result, Kinder’s healthcare choices will not be affected and he does
not have standing to assert the claim in Count II.  Even if I were to consider his new argument
that the nature and cost of insurance affects his ability to recruit and hire employees for the
Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Kinder would still lack standing.  Kinder does not assert that
his recruitment and hiring is negatively impacted by the PPACA, but merely that such efforts are
affected.  This fails to establish that Kinder, as an individual, has been injured.   
The remaining Plaintiffs have also failed to establish they are injured by Section 1513. 
Plaintiffs’ allegation that the PPACA will increase burdens on the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor, which will result in increased costs to Missouri taxpayers, is too speculative and
devoid of factual allegations for me to find Plaintiffs have sustained or will sustain an injury
arising from Section 1513.  Plaintiffs also lack standing because their alleged injury would be the
result of an independent action of a third party (the State of Missouri) which is not before the
court.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.  Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert a violation of the Tenth
Amendment in Count II.  “[A] private party does not have standing to assert that the federal
government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment absent the
involvement of a state or its instrumentalities.”  Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526.  It is clear the State of
Missouri is not a party to this action and Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert a violation of
the Tenth Amendment in Count II.
(c.) Counts V, VI, and IX 
In Counts V, VI, and IX Plaintiff Hill asserts various challenges to the PPACA’s
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requirement to purchase health insurance and the financial penalty that will be assessed if
qualifying health insurance is not purchased.  Hill does not currently have health insurance.  In
Count V, Hill alleges the PPACA exceeds the power granted to Congress under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.  In Count VI, Hill alleges the financial penalty imposed upon her if
she does not purchase health insurance is unconstitutional.  In Count IX, Hill alleges the PPACA
is unconstitutional because it abrogates her rights under the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act8
by requiring her to purchase a particular type of health insurance.  Defendants argue Hill does not
have standing to assert the claims in Counts V, VI, and IX because she has failed to allege an
injury.  
In Count V, Hill argues the PPACA is unconstitutional because “to the extent she is
required to purchase health-care coverage [she] desires to obtain only high-deductible ‘major
medical’ or ‘catastrophic’ health insurance coverage.”   Hill alleges that under Section 1302(e)9
she does not fall within the definition of citizens who may satisfy their essential minimum
coverage with catastrophic health insurance.  Defendants argue Hill does not have standing to
assert the constitutional challenge in Count V because she has not alleged an injury.
 Hill asserts that Section 1302(e) injures her because she will not be able to satisfy the
health insurance requirement by purchasing a catastrophic care plan.  Hill incorrectly argues that
under Section 1302(e) a citizen may maintain a catastrophic plan “only if an individual is under
30 years of age and certifies that his or her premium payment is more than eight percent of his or
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her househould income.”   Defendants correctly note that a qualifying catastrophic care plan will10
meet the essential health benefits package requirement if an individual is under 30 years of age or
meets the tests of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e) with respect to affordable coverage or financial hardship. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(e)(2) (2010).  Because Hill will be under 30 in 2014 when the
requirement takes effect, she will be able to satisfy the health insurance requirement by
maintaining a catastrophic care plan.  Because Hill will be able to satisfy the essential health
benefits requirement by maintaining a catastrophic plan, Hill has failed to establish that she is or
will be injured by Section 1302(e) and, as a result, does not have standing to assert the claim in
Count V.11
Kinder attempts to assert a new cause of action in Plaintiffs’ Response by stating he
“joins Samantha Hill in [C]ounts [V, VI, and IX].”   A statement in a response in opposition to a12
motion to dismiss is not the proper method to amend a complaint to assert a new claim.  I will
not consider the merits of Kinder’s claims that are not included in the Amended Complaint.
In Count VI, Hill alleges that Section 1501 of the Act is unconstitutional because it will
impose a financial penalty upon her “should [she] not purchase a federally-mandated health
insurance policy.”   Defendants again argue that Hill has failed to allege that she has standing to13
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assert this claim.  While Hill reasserts her merits argument in her Response, she fails to point to
anything in the Amended Complaint that establishes the Section 1501 financial penalty will be
imposed upon her.  Hill does not allege in the Amended Complaint that she will not purchase a
qualifying policy in 2014.  Instead, Hill asserts that if she does not purchase a qualifying health
insurance policy, then a penalty will be imposed upon her.  Hill does not assert that she will not
purchase a qualifying policy in 2014 and, as a result, it is unclear whether a financial penalty will
be imposed upon her.  Because it is unclear whether a financial penalty will be imposed upon
her, Hill has failed to allege that she will sustain an injury.
In Count IX, Hill argues that the PPACA is unconstitutional because it abrogates her
rights under the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act without due process of law.  The Missouri
Health Care Freedom Act provides that “no law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any
person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system.” MO. ANN.
STAT. § 1.330(1) (West 2010).  The Missouri Health Care Freedom Act also provides “[a] person
or employer may pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be required by law or
rule to pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services.” MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 1.330(2) (West 2010). 
Hill’s assertions in the Amended Complaint simply do not confer standing to assert this
challenge because she has not alleged an injury inflicted by the PPACA.  Hill does not allege that
she currently does not participate in a health care system, only that she does not have health
insurance.  Furthermore, Hill will be able to satisfy the PPACA’s essential minimum coverage
with catastrophic coverage, the type of insurance she indicates in the Amended Complaint that
she would want to purchase under the PPACA.  Finally, because Hill does not allege that she will
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not purchase health insurance in 2014 it is uncertain whether she will be assessed a financial
penalty under the PPACA.  Accordingly, Plaintiff Hill has failed to allege that she has sustained
an injury in order to pursue the claim in Count IX. 
A plaintiff “generally must assert [her] own legal rights and interests and cannot rest [her]
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474. 
Because Hill has failed to allege that she is or will be personally injured by the provisions she
challenges, she does not have standing to assert the claims she pursues in Counts V, VI, and IX
and they will be dismissed.  
(d.) Count VIII 
In Count VIII, Plaintiffs allege that Section 4003 of the PPACA unconstitutionally
establishes panels “to determine levels of appropriate treatment for various health care
situations.”   Plaintiffs argue this violates the autonomy of the doctor-patient relationship and14
the individual liberty interests of Plaintiffs to make personal medical decisions.  Plaintiffs allege
that “even when a patient and their physician determine the best medical treatment for the
patient, and even if the patient is willing to pay for the cost of the treatment herself, she is not
allowed to receive the medical treatment her physician deems appropriate unless it is also agreed
to by the government panel established under PPACA.”   15
Defendants argue that Section 4003 does not have any of the effects alleged by Plaintiffs. 
Defendants also argue that the task forces addressed in Section 4003 existed prior to the
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PPACA’s enactment and Plaintiffs have failed to allege any injury resulting from the operation of
these task forces. 
Plaintiffs’ claim in Count VIII fails for two reasons.  First, Plaintiffs have failed to
indicate what part of Section 4003 supports their allegation and I, in my review of the plain
language of the statute, have not found any language that supports Plaintiffs’ claim that the task
forces will prevent a doctor and patient from pursuing a medical treatment plan.  The main thrust
of Section 4003 as it pertains to the Preventative Services Task Force (“PSTF”) is that it “shall
review the scientific evidence related to the effectiveness, appropriateness, and cost-effectiveness
of clinical preventative services for the purpose of developing recommendations for the health
care community, and updating previous clinical preventive recommendations.”  42 U.S.C. §
299b-4(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).  The PSTF may also provide technical assistance to health
care professionals, agencies, and organizations if they “request help implementing the Guide
recommendations.”  42 U.S.C. § 299b-4(a)(3) (2010) (emphasis added).  Section 4003 has a
similar effect on the Community Preventative Services Task Force (“CPSTF”).  The CPSTF shall
“review the scientific evidence related to the effectiveness, appropriateness, and cost-
effectiveness of community preventative interventions for the purpose of developing
recommendations.”  42 U.S.C. § 280g-10(a) (2010) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs must clearly
allege that they have suffered a injury that is “concrete and particularized” and not “conjectural
or hypothetical.”  Lujan, 504, U.S. at 560.  There is simply nothing in the plain meaning of the
statute’s language from which I can conclude that Plaintiffs have alleged a concrete injury arising
from the challenged provision.
The second deficiency in Plaintiffs’ claim is that they fail to allege any injury resulting
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from the operation of either of the task forces addressed in Section 4003.  Section 4003 did not
establish the task forces in question, but amended existing statutes.  Because Plaintiffs fail to
allege an injury from the operation of the task forces, fail to allege an actual injury from Section
4003, and fail to allege a concrete future injury I find that Plaintiffs have failed to establish they
are injured by Section 4003.  As a result, Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert their claim in
Count VIII at this time.   16
2. Ripeness 
“Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing.  Its basic rationale is to prevent the courts,
through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.”  Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (citations and alternations
omitted). “[T]he fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration must inform any analysis of ripeness.”  Id.  A court must decline
to exercise jurisdiction if “the issue is so premature that the court would have to speculate as to
the presence of a real injury.”  Meadows of W. Memphis v. City of W. Memphis, Ark., 800 F.2d
212, 214 (8th. Cir. 1986). 
(a.) Count III 
Count III alleges the PPACA unconstitutionally levies a direct tax upon the State of
Missouri and its citizens.  Plaintiff Keathley on behalf of M.K. alleges that M.K. suffers from
autism and would benefit from behavioral therapy.  Missouri requires insurance companies
Case: 1:10-cv-00101-RWS   Doc. #:  37    Filed: 04/26/11   Page: 15 of 21 PageID #: 565
The Amended Complaint asserts the maximum benefit available is $36,000 and cites17
Missouri Senate Bill 167 from the 2009 legislative session. The statute indicates the maximum
benefit available is actually $40,000. MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1224(5) (West 2010).   
42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2010). 18
 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’19
Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 32 at 6 (emphasis added).
 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).20
 Id. 21
-16-
insuring Missouri residents to provide coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of autism
spectrum disorders.  MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1224 (2) (West 2010).   Keathley alleges that17
Section 1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) of PPACA  will impose a fee upon Missouri “because Missouri18
requires private health insurance companies to offer more coverage than PPACA’s mandated
coverage.”  Keathley argues she “[has] the constitutional right to enjoy the benefits of Missouri
citizenship without those benefits being directly subject to a penurious tax levied by the federal
government.”  Plaintiffs’ Response expands on this argument to assert that Keathley is not
asserting an injury as a Missouri taxpayer but is injured by the “tax” because it “may well force
Missouri to discontinue [the autism behavioral therapy] benefits” which is an “obvious threat” to
Keathley and M.K.   Keathley argues further that the “imposition of [a] sur-tax on19
Missouri...will likely destroy [Keathley and M.K.’s] coverage.   Plaintiffs also argue their claim20
is ripe because I “must consider PPACA as it now reads-not as it might someday be
supplemented by regulations” and that as currently drafted, nothing in PPACA provides a benefit
similar to the benefit Keathley and M.K. currently have.  21
Defendants move to dismiss Count III arguing that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
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because Plaintiffs’ claim is not ripe for judicial consideration.  Defendants argue that Count III is
not ripe because Section 1302(b)(1) does not define what “essential health benefits” are and
requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to define the term.    Because neither22
proposed nor final regulations have been promulgated, Defendants argue it is not possible to
know whether behavioral therapy for autism will be included in the definition of “essential health
benefits” and, as a result, Plaintiffs’ claim in Count III is not ripe for judicial consideration.
    A claim is not ripe if I must speculate as to the existence of an injury.  Here, Count III
is not ripe because it cannot be determined whether behavioral therapy will be included in the
definition of “essential health benefits” and it is not possible to predict how Missouri will
respond to the hypothetical exclusion of behavioral therapy for children with autism.  There are
numerous scenarios in which Keathley and M.K. may or may not be injured and various forms in
which the potential injuries could manifest.   It is unclear at this time whether the therapy in23
question will be included in the definition of “essential health benefits.”  I will not engage in
speculation of how Missouri may respond to hypothetical definitions of essential health benefits
which may or may not give rise to Keathley and M.K. sustaining an injury.  As a result, this
claim is not ripe for judicial consideration and I will dismiss Count III because I lack subject
matter jurisdiction. 
Count III must also be dismissed for lack of standing.  Keathley asserts that Section 1311
Case: 1:10-cv-00101-RWS   Doc. #:  37    Filed: 04/26/11   Page: 17 of 21 PageID #: 567
 Because none of the Plaintiffs assert that they are or would become enrolled in24
Medicaid or that they are healthcare providers, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert these claims in
these capacities and I decline to address the merits of these arguments.
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion25
to Dismiss, Docket No. 32 at 8.
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violates the Tenth Amendment.  As discussed above, “a private party does not have standing to
assert that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth
Amendment absent the involvement of a state or its instrumentalities.”  Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526. 
The State of Missouri is not a party to this action, and Keathley and M.K. lack standing to assert
a violation of the Tenth Amendment in Count III.   
(b.) Count IV 
Count IV alleges Section 2001 of the Act will force Missouri citizens that currently have
private insurance to enroll in Medicaid, with injurious effects on enrollees, health-care providers,
and Missouri taxpayers.   Plaintiffs allege Missouri taxpayers will be injured by paying24
increased taxes in order to pay for the medical care for the newly enrolled individuals.  Plaintiffs
argue Missouri will only be able to pay this additional cost by increasing the taxes paid by
Missouri taxpayers.  Plaintiffs further allege that the Missouri Constitution prohibits Missouri
from raising state taxes without conducting a vote by the citizens of Missouri and that no such
vote has taken place.  In sum, Plaintiffs argue the PPACA is unconstitutional because it will
“require” the State of Missouri to violate the Missouri Constitution.  Plaintiffs contend this is not
a mere speculative tax increase but “a specific [quantified] injury alleged in mathematical detail
over the space of two full pages.”     25
A claim is not ripe if I must speculate as to the existence of an injury.  Meadows of W.
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Memphis, 800 F.2d at 214.  I find that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that this claim is ripe for
judicial consideration.  Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs would have standing to assert
this claim should such an increase in taxes actually occur, it is not at all sufficiently certain that
Missouri will raise taxes in order to pay for additional Medicaid spending.  Even less certain is
whether Missouri would raise taxes in a manner that would constitute a violation of the Missouri
Constitution.  Plaintiffs do not cite any provision of the Act that indicates a state must pay for any
additional Medicaid spending in a manner that violates that state’s constitution.  Instead,
Plaintiffs speculate as to the manner in which Missouri will pay for a Medicaid spending
increase.  Reliance on such speculation prevents this claim from being ripe for judicial
consideration.  As a result, I will dismiss Count IV because it does not present a live case and
controversy.
Count IV must also be dismissed for lack of standing.  Plaintiffs allege Section 2001
violates the Tenth Amendment.  As discussed above, “a private party does not have standing to
assert that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth
Amendment absent the involvement of a state or its instrumentalities.”  Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526. 
The State of Missouri is not a party to this action, and Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a violation
of the Tenth Amendment in Count IV.
3.  Mootness 
A federal court does not have jurisdiction to hear a case that is moot.  Hickman v. State of
Mo., 144 F.3d 1141, 1142 (8th Cir. 1998).  A case is considered moot when it “no longer
presents an actual, ongoing case or controversy.” Id. (quoting Marine Equip. Mgmt. Co. v.
United States, 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1993).
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 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’26
Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 32 at 12.
Even if Plaintiffs were to amend their complaint to assert a challenge to Section 1102,27
they would not have standing to pursue the claim.  Plaintiffs’ allegation is based on the premise
that the counties they live in are not classified as qualifying counties and, as a result, they will
receive disparate treatment under the Act. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
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(a.) Count VII 
Plaintiffs Morris, Robert Osborn, and Geraldine Osborn allege in Count VII that Section
3201 of the Act unconstitutionally reduces Medicare Part C (or “Medicare Advantage”) coverage
in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Each of these Plaintiffs are eligible for Medicare Advantage.  Plaintiffs argue
Section 3201 reduces Medicare Advantage supplemental coverage by eliminating the Medicare
Advantage Stabilization Fund.  Plaintiffs assert that this prohibition of Medicare Advantage
coverage applies to all Missouri citizen except for individuals described in Section 3201(c)(3)(B)
of the PPACA, who Plaintiffs allege live in certain qualifying counties of Florida.  Plaintiffs
allege they will be unconstitutionally denied access to Medicare Advantage based on where they
live.
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed because the challenged provision
has been repealed in its entirety by Section 1102 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010.  Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1040 (Mar. 30, 2010).  In their Response,
Plaintiffs assert a new basis for their claim and attempt to challenge the provision that replaced
Section 3201 by arguing the new provision “perpetrates the same improper and unequal
treatment...as did the original version.”   As discussed above, asserting a new claim in a26
response is not a procedurally recognized basis for amending a complaint.   27
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counties.   As a result, Plaintiffs would not have standing to pursue this claim even if they were
to properly amend their complaint.  This presents a timely example of why a court must exercise
judicial restraint and only hear cases presenting a live case and controversy.  Plaintiffs based their
claim on speculation and a hypothetical scenario that proved to be false. 
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A case is considered moot when it “no longer presents an actual, ongoing case or
controversy.” Id.  Because the statute challenged by Plaintiffs has been repealed, Count VII no
longer presents a live case or controversy and must be dismissed. 
B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted
Because I have found that I do not have subject matter jurisdiction over any of the Counts
in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, I do not reach the merits of Defendants’ argument under Rule
12(b)(6).  
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Supplementary
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss [#35] is GRANTED. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [#30] is
GRANTED.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED. 
Dated this 26th day of April, 2011.
__________________________________
RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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